We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated every period. The workers' bargaining power in the hours negotiation a¤ects both unemployment volatility and in ‡ation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i) the more …rms adjust on the intensive margin, reducing employment volatility, (ii) the lower the e¤ective workers'bargaining power for wages and (iii) the more important the hourly wage in the marginal cost determination. This set-up produces realistic labor market statistics together with in ‡ation persistence.
Introduction
Real wage and labor market dynamics are crucial for understanding the in ‡ation process. Standard new-Keynesian models contain only a highly abstract description of the labor market which does not allow for involuntary unemployment and real wage rigidity. These two issues are key when monetary policy faces complicated trade-o¤ decisions. Search and matching models, on the other hand, provide a more realistic framework that can be used to analyze unemployment and wage bargaining situations.
This explains the recent e¤orts to integrate frictional unemployment in new-Keynesian models with price and wage nominal stickiness. The initial expectation is that the combination of real and nominal wage stickiness is able to produce endogenous in ‡ation persistence, while at the same time the search and matching frictions can produce realistic labor market outcomes.
This research program faces two major di¢ culties. The …rst is related to labor market modelling: since the contributions of Hall (2005a) and Shimer (2004) , it is known that the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model is not able to produce the observed volatilities of employment and vacancies. However, these contributions also show that the introduction of wage rigidities for newly created jobs allows one to circumvent this di¢ culty. Following their insight, we adopt the Gertler and Trigari (2006) framework and model infrequent wage bargaining through a time dependent schedule à la Calvo. In addition, we allow nominal wage rigidity to be di¤erent for existing and newly created jobs. Indeed, these two types of rigidities have very di¤erent e¤ects on the economy: the …rst is especially important to reduce the wage volatility and enhance in ‡ation persistence while the second is crucial for the volatility of labor market variables.
A second di¢ culty arises from the combination of the search and matching setup with nominal price stickiness. In the standard search and matching model, both capital and labor are predetermined and prices are the only source of ‡exibility in the short run. Such a market clearing role for prices is di¢ cult to reconcile with the observed price stickiness and in ‡ation persistence. Several solutions to this problem have been imagined so far. For example, one could consider that employment can adjust instantaneously, with the inconvenient that it becomes a jump variable, contrasting with empirical observation. 1 Others (e.g. Trigari, 2004 and Walsh, 2005) consider endogenous job destruction with the drawback that most labor adjustment occurs through the …ring channel, in contradiction with the new hiring statistics that show acyclical job destruction (Shimer, 2007 and Hall, 2005b) . 2 The present paper focuses on an alternative solution allowing labor to adjust at the intensive margin, that is allowing hours worked to be modi…ed along the business cycle. Several 1 Actually, the fact that employment is predetermined or not depends essentially of the time span represented by one period in the model. On a monthly basis, employment is probably predetermined, but on a quarterly basis it is rational to consider that it can adjust instantaneously (e.g. Gali, 2006 or Gertler, Sala and Trigari, 2007) . 2 This view is however still debated. Some elements of the controversy can be found in Fujita and Ramey (2007) and Elsby et al. (2008) .
recent papers have worked on this idea 3 which actually adapts the labor union literature on employment bargaining to endogenize the working time decision. Indeed, in the search and matching literature, unions have no direct in ‡uence on the hiring or …ring process: …rms decide alone whether to post a vacancy and most models consider exogenous job destruction. In this sense, the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework is close to the idea of the 'right-to-manage' (Nickell, 1982) . However, within the labor contract long-term relationship, it seems natural that any decision a¤ecting working time should be discussed by the two parties to the contract.
An important part of the literature on the intensive margin is developed under the assumption that hours and wages are re-bargained every period. In the present paper we want to analyze the consequences of combining staggered wage bargaining with continuously re-negotiated hours worked. Indeed, observed collective wage bargaining is infrequent, at least for institutional reasons. Given the medium-to-long run agreement reached for the wage, the workforce can be adjusted along the business cycle. This adjustment can occur either on the extensive margin, which is a costly and time-consuming process, or on the intensive margin, but in this case it is likely to involve some negotiation. This setup is actually very close to the idea of sequential bargaining introduced by Manning (1987) , the main di¤erences being that (i ) he considers employment instead of individual working time and (ii ) his wage-employment sequential bargain happens every period. For the rest, we also allow bargaining power to be di¤erent in the wage and in the hours negotiations, following the intuition that the workers'in ‡uence over di¤erent aspects may vary widely. 4 This paper is certainly not the …rst to combine ‡exible working time with time-dependent wage bargaining. For example, Christo¤el, Linzert and Kuester (2006) assume that hours are unilaterally decided by the …rm each period and Thomas (2008) considers that the infrequent non-cooperative nominal wage bargain is based on the anticipation that …rms and workers somehow manage to reach a period-by-period privately e¢ cient working time decision. 5 Thomas (2008) . 4 This can be the case for institutional reasons. For example, in the United States, wages belong to the list of mandatory issues on which employers have to bargain with unions, while employment and working time are listed as permissive issues. As exampli…ed by Manning (1987, page 125) , the legal structure can play an important role in di¤erentiating the bargaining power by issues: "In the United States strikes at contract renegotiations about mandatory issues are legal, but strikes about permissive issues in the course of contracts are not ". 5 In the remainder of the paper, we will consider for simplicity that this is the outcome of some cooperative behavior.
view, it leads to very unsatisfactory results regarding labor market statistics. Because of the huge ‡exibility given to …rms, labor adjustments occur mainly on the intensive margin, inducing unrealistic responses in hours and strongly reducing employment volatility.
Compared with these two ways of modelling the working time decision, the sequential bargaining procedure discussed in this paper displays some interesting features. First, it is fully coherent with the rules of the non-cooperative game theory. Second, it o¤ers a general set-up of which the two above mentioned hours setting assumptions are a special case. Indeed, the CLK (2006) model is obtained simply by setting to zero workers' bargaining power relative to the working time issue. We also display that there exists a value of this bargaining power such that the working time is independent of the wage and for this parametrization, the model is a fairly close approximation of Thomas (2008) . …rst discusses the calibration to US data and then simulates the models to study their dynamic behavior after a productivity and a monetary policy shock. In particular we assess the ability of the models to match US labor market statistics and to generate in ‡ation persistence. The simulation exercise provides an opportunity to discuss the impact of several parameters such as the workers'bargaining power in the hours negotiation, the Calvo probabilities to bargain the wage of an existing or of a newly created job. Section 4 concludes.
The Model
The production side of the economy is very similar to Wouters (2003, 2007) 
Each intermediate good is produced by a single …rm and sold in a market characterized by monopolistic competition. Intermediate producers rent capital servicesk t directly from the households and labor services l t from labor …rms and they combine these inputs using a Cobb-Douglas technology
where " a t represents total factor productivity modelled as an autoregressive process of order 1
iidN .
As we assume constant returns to scale and price-taking behavior on the input markets, the real marginal cost x t is independent of the price and production levels:
where t and r k t represent the competitive price of labor services and capital services respectively. We consider time-dependent price setting à la Calvo (1983) . At each period, each intermediate good …rm has a constant probability (1 p ) that it will have an opportunity to reset a new price. This price will prevail for j periods with probability j p . All the intermediate goods producers who are allowed to reset their selling price at time t face exactly the same optimization problem and will therefore choose the same optimal price p t . They …x it in order to maximize the expected ‡ow of discounted pro…ts. The producers who cannot change their price are able to index it on a weighted average of past and trend in ‡ation. These assumptions lead to the following log-linearized new-Keynesian Phillips curve for in ‡ation t :
where hats denote variables expressed in percentage deviation from steady state. Parameter is the subjective discount factor and p represents the weight given to past in ‡ation in the indexation process.
The labor input of the intermediate goods …rms is produced by a continuum of one-worker labor …rms that will be carefully described in section 2.2 below. Let us simply say at this stage that the labor …rms sell homogenous labor services on a competitive market to monopolistic intermediate producers. This model structure isolates the wage decision from the price decision.
The rest of the section focuses on the household optimisation and the labor market representation.
Households
Households consist of a continuum of workers indexed by on the unit interval. Workers supply an homogeneous type of labor, but only a proportion n t of them is employed. Furthermore, employed workers may receive di¤erent wages and di¤er in their worked hours due to labor market speci…cities that will be discussed in subsection 2.2.3 below. Because of our representative -or large-household interpretation, the unemployment rate u t is identical at the household and aggregate level. As exempli…ed by Merz (1995) , the representative household assumption amounts to consider state-contingent securities insuring workers against di¤erences in their speci…c labor income. Family members share their labor income, i.e. wage and unemployment bene…ts, before choosing per capita consumption, investment, bond holdings and the degree of capacity utilization.
The representative household's total real income is therefore equal to aggregate income
This is made up of labor income, the return on the real capital stock and pro…ts t generated by the monopolistic competitive intermediate producer …rms and the hiring …rms. Labor income is the sum of the average total wage (the product of hourly wage w t ( ) by hours h t ( )) and of the unemployment bene…t b, 6 weighted by the employment-unemployment proportions. Households hold the capital stock k t 1 , a homogeneous production factor, and rent capital services to intermediate goods producers at the rental rate r k t . They can adjust the capital supply either by varying the capacity utilization rate z t or by buying new capital goods which take one period to be installed. The steady state utilization rate is normalized to 1 and we assume that there is a cost (z t ) associated with variations in the degree of capacity utilization
so that (1) = 0 while parameter represents the elasticity of the capital utilization cost function and ! is a scaling parameter. The capital accumulation process follows
where i t is gross investment and the depreciation rate. We assume quadratic adjustment costs associated with changes in investment.
Households hold their …nancial wealth in the form of bonds B t : Bonds are one-period securities with price 1=R t : The budget constraint faced by the representative household may be written as
where c t represents aggregate consumption and p t is the price index.
We assume separability between leisure and consumption in the instantaneous utility function. Therefore, all the members of the representative household share the same marginal utility of wealth and choose the same optimal consumption, even though they do not spend the same amount of time at work. Adding external consumption habits, the household utility function can be written
6 It could alternatively be interpreted as the income generated by the domestic activities of an unemployed worker.
with 0 < e < 1 and 0. Let H t be the value function of the representative household. If we momentarily leave aside the labor supply decision, its maximization program is
The consumer's optimal decision results in the following equations for the marginal utility of consumption t , capital utilization rate, investment and the real value of capital p k t :
; (11)
Labor market 2.2.1 Labor market ‡ows
We normalize the labor force to one, so that n t represents both the total number of jobs and the employment rate. This leads to the following accounting identity:
where u t denotes the number of unemployed job-seekers. Let m t denote the number of new …rm-worker matches. We assume that the number of matches is a function of the number of job vacancies v t and e¤ective job seekers u t , and we consider the following linear homogeneous matching function:
For an unemployed worker, the probability of …nding a job is given by
while the probability that a …rm …lls a vacancy is
An exogenous proportion s of …rm-worker relationships terminates each period, which implies the following employment dynamics:
One-worker hiring …rms
As described above, the labor-hiring …rms are intermediaries renting labor services from households and selling these services to intermediate-goods producers at a hourly rate t on a competitive market. In this sense, their role is very similar to that of the labor packers in the traditional new-Keynesian model with staggered wages and walrasian labor markets (see Erceg, Levin and
Henderson (2000)). However, instead of aggregating di¤erentiated types of labor, the role of the hiring …rms is to …nd workers in the pool of unemployed. Keeping the Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) assumption that they can hire at most one worker, we consider a continuum of hiring …rms indexed by l, with l distributed over the unit interval.
Labor e¢ ciency is decreasing with hours, so that h hours supplied by one worker produce only h units of e¤ective labor, with < 1: 7 Consequently, hiring …rm l produces either 0 or [h t (l)] units of e¤ective labor and aggregate e¤ective labor can be computed as
Time-dependent staggered wage setting and ‡exible hours
The hourly wage is assumed to be bargained between the hiring …rm and its employee. However, the wage is not bargained in every period since such negotiations are observed to be infrequent.
According to this, we assume a time-dependent setting à la Calvo wherein each period only a fraction (1 o w ) of all existing wage contracts is renegotiated. All other nominal wages are simply adjusted for trend in ‡ation .
Newly created jobs are paid either the previous-period contract wage or the currently bargained wage with respective probabilities n w and (1 n w ). The 'previous-period contract wage' is a roundabout way to say that the actual wage is drawn out of the wage distribution prevailing in the previous period and indexed to trend in ‡ation. As long as the draw is not realized, the expected real wage of such a …rm is equal to the indexed past average wage w t 1 p t 1 pt , with pt p t 1 = t . Note that for o w = n w , this assumption is very close to considering a continuum of large …rms, each …rm paying the same wage to all its workers, as in Gertler and Trigari (2006) . 8 However, allowing o w 6 = n w gives somewhat more ‡exibility. In particular it will prove useful when assessing the di¤erent roles played by nominal wage rigidity: n w is particularly important to induce vacancies volatility while o w helps to increase in ‡ation persistence. 9 Finally, there is a growing body of empirical evidence that the wage rigidity for new jobs could be smaller than this of existing jobs (e.g. Haefke et al. (2007) , or Pissarides (2007) ). 7 This decreasing returns to scale assumption is particularly important for the determination of working time in the case where …rms decide it unilaterally. 8 Actually the only di¤erence would come from the 'horizon e¤ect', i.e. the fact that with a continuum of large …rms, the horizon of the labor contract of the worker is smaller than that of the …rm since the latter continues its activity forever. In our one-job-per-…rm set-up, …rm and worker share the same horizon. 9 As illustrated by Bodart and al. (2005) , there is a deep interaction between Even though the wage bargaining will be discussed in detail below, it is important at this stage to stress that all the 'hiring …rm-worker' pairs that are given the opportunity to (re)-negotiate their wage contract face the same problem and therefore set the same wage. Because of the time-dependent aspect of wage negotiation, workers may be paid di¤erent wages, even though they share the same productivity. Furthermore, given the bargained hourly wage, we allow the …rm-worker pair some ‡exibility to react to unexpected shocks by adjusting working time every period. The exact connection between hours and wages will be described in section 2.2.5 below. At this stage, let us simply assume that hours worked are a function of the real wage. Formally, w t i i p t i pt denotes the real value at time t of the nominal hourly wage negotiated i periods earlier while h t (w t i ) represents the corresponding hours worked: From the employment dynamics equation (17), we may express the real value of the average total wage as
Note that in the particular case n w = o w = w , i.e. if new hires have the same probability of bargaining their wage as existing jobs, expression (19) simpli…es to
so that we have a microfounded wage equation similar to the wage rigidities equation proposed in Blanchard and Gali (2006) .
Recursively developing expression (19) , we obtain the weight W t i associated with each wage w t i bargained in the past and its corresponding hours worked:
Average hours worked h t (w t ) is then simply computed as:
Asset values of a job
Let us …rst adopt the viewpoint of a labor-hiring …rm. We denote A f t (w t j ) the asset value in period t of a job with a wage that was bargained j periods earlier. It will prove convenient to recast this value in marginal utility terms, multiplying it by t :
The value of a job expressed in marginal utility of consumption may then be written as
where t is the competitive price at which the hiring …rm sells labor services to the intermediate goods …rms.
If we now adopt the household viewpoint, the value of a job with a wage bargained j periods earlier is given by
where V u t represents the present value of being unemployed at period t. Formally,
and E t V n t+1 (w t ) is simply the expected value of a new job in the next period if the wage of the latter is not bargained but drawn out of the previous-period wage distribution. De…ning
Wage and hours bargaining
As already noted, all the renegotiating 'hiring …rm-worker' pairs face the same problem and therefore choose the same wage w t . We assume that this wage is decided through a Nash bargaining procedure, i.e. it solves the following problem
where parameter w 2 (0; 1) represents the household's bargaining power in the wage negotiation.
The …rst-order condition implies the sharing rule:
with
The total derivatives with respect to wage depend on the sequence of expected hours worked because of the assumption that working time is allowed to adjust every period.
Cooperative hours determination If …rms and workers decide to cooperatively set hours in order to maximize the period joint surplus as in Thomas (2008) , working time is (27) so that working time depends only on macroeconomic variables and the wage is not allocational for hours, as in a traditional e¢ cient bargaining model with ‡exible wage. Consequently, the two total derivatives (25) and (26) are identical except for the sign and the optimality condition for the wage bargain simply states that the ratio of household/…rm intertemporal surpluses is equal to their relative bargaining power. From this expression, it is clear that the competitive price of labor t only depends on hours worked and the marginal utility of consumption. It is absolutely not in ‡uenced by the average hourly wage and consequently, the nominal wage rigidity of existing jobs does not help to increase in ‡ation persistence by smoothing the marginal cost.
Non-cooperative hours determination Let us now assume that, given the wage bargained j periods ago, the two parties to the contract seek to maximize their individual period surplus through a period-by-period hours negotiation. We allow the worker bargaining power h 2 (0; 1) in this particular negotiation to be di¤erent from the one on wages ( w ):
De…ning
the …rst order condition is obtained for F t (w t j ) = 0.
In the particular case h = 0, the …rm retains the right to manage working time and it equalizes the marginal cost of one unit of time with its marginal revenue. At the other extreme, if h = 1, the worker supplies labor until the revenue of the marginal hour is equal to its disutility.
The …rst derivative of hours with respect to wage is negative for h = 0 and positive for h = 1.
In between, it is monotonically increasing with h , implying that there exists a value of h such that the wage is not allocational for hours. For this particular value the positive e¤ect of a wage increase on labor supply is exactly compensated by the negative e¤ect on labor demand. This can be seen by loglinearizing the …rst order condition F t (w t j ) = 0 around the steady state :
where variables with a hat denote percentage deviation from steady state, the bar above a variable indicates its steady state value and F x is the derivative of F with respect to x (x = w; ; ) considered at steady state. We can derive
b .
As long as h is di¤erent from this particular value, the competitive price of labor services t is directly linked to the hourly wage, a feature some authors call the 'wage channel' (Trigari, 2006, Christo¤el and Linzert, 2005) . Since equation (30) holds for any wage, it is also valid for the aggregate hourly wage w t with the consequence that nominal and real wage rigidities will directly a¤ect in ‡ation persistence.
In the case h = 0 studied by Christo¤el, Kuester and Linzert (2006), we obtain
and H = 0 so that the link between wage and the competitive price of labor is one-for-one. However, this assumption that the …rm is given the right to manage working time implies that the distribution of individual hours worked is (1 ) 2 times higher than the variance of the distribution of wage. This is especially large when is close to unity.
This serious problem can be solved by increasing the household bargaining power in the working time negotiation. In order to show this, Figure 1 plots the coe¢ cients in the loglinearized hours equation as a function of workers' bargaining power on hours, h . Since a change in parameter h implies a modi…cation of the steady state, this graph has been drawn numerically, using the same calibration as described in section 3.1 below.
[insert Figure 1 ]
The …rst observation we can draw from Figure 1 is that the absolute values of the wage and competitive labor price coe¢ cients decrease rapidly and remain very close to each other as h increases away from zero. Therefore, an increase of the parameter h helps to reduce strongly the impact of a change in the bargained wage on the variation (and distribution) of hours while at the same time, for a fairly wide range of values, it only weakly alters the wage channel. Second, note that H and H are both equal to 1 1+ + when H w is equal to zero, which is a property of the model with cooperatively chosen hours. 10 From this we infer that the model with sequential bargaining and infrequently bargained wages o¤ers a general set-up able to encompass both the right-to-manage model and a close approximation of the cooperatively chosen hours model as particular cases.
Job creation and hiring costs
Let A n t represent the asset value of a new job for the …rm, which can be written as follows:
The asset value of a vacant job A v t is then given by:
where c v t is the recurrent cost of opening a vacancy. In order to make our results comparable with Gertler and Trigari (2006), we follow them and assume that the average cost per hire 11 is a linear function of the hiring rate m t =n t :
As Yashiv (2006) explains, this assumption emphasizes the cost of incorporating the newly hired workers into the labor force (e.g. training costs) while the usual constant vacancy posting cost focuses on the search cost. Considering the free entry condition A v t = 0, equation (33) can be recast in:
The latter expression makes clear that the dynamics of job creation is leaded by the hiring rate while with more traditional constant recurrent vacancy posting posting costs, this role is played by the labor market tightness.
Market equilibrium and monetary authority behavior
The …nal goods market is in equilibrium if production equals demand augmented by the various adjustment costs. Households consume, invest and incur adjustment costs when adjusting the 1 0 This can be easily veri…ed by loglinearizing equation (27) . 1 1 In other words, the cost of adjusting the workforce along the extensive margin.
rate of capital utilization while hiring …rms face vacancy posting costs
The capital market is in equilibrium when the supply of capital services by households satis…es the demand for capital of the intermediate goods producers.
The interest rate is determined by a reaction function that describes monetary policy decisions:
where " r t is an exogenous monetary policy shock speci…ed as an i.i.d. normal process. In this simpli…ed Taylor rule, monetary authorities respond to deviations of in ‡ation from its objective . The chosen calibration is standard.
Simulations and model comparison
We divide our simulation exercise in two di¤erent parts. First, we examine the ability of the models described in the paper to reproduce second moments of the US labor market data after a productivity shock. In a second step, we compare the corresponding impulse response functions obtained after a monetary policy shock and focus on their ability to produce in ‡ation persistence. Table 1 displays the value of the parameters that are kept unchanged through the various model variants in the simulation exercise. In order to properly assess the high rate of job …nding that characterizes the US labor market, we opt for a monthly calibration. The key parameters of the business cycle literature are calibrated at conventional values: the chosen discount factor implies an annual steady state real interest rate of 4 percent, capital depreciates by 10% on an annual basis, the capital share is equal to 0.33 and the autocorrelation of the productivity shock is set at 0:95 1=3 . Parameters related to the search and matching setup, are mainly calibrated as in Gertler and Trigari (2006) . Since there is no strong evidence on the degree of bargaining power, we assign equal power to workers and …rms ( = 0:5). As usual, the worker bargaining power on wage is equal to the match elasticity to unemployment ( w = 1 #). 12 The separation rate s = 0:035 is standard and supported by strong empirical evidence. The unemployment bene…t b is supposed constant and we assume that the replacement ratio (between unemployment bene…ts and the average wage) is 40 percent: b = 0:4 w. We also impose that the job-…nding rate and vacancy-…lling rate are equal to 0.45 at the steady state ( j = q = 0:45). These restrictions yield the values of # m (matching e¢ ciency) and (…xed part of the vacancy-opening cost). Parameter 1 2 In a ‡exible model, this condition would guarantee an e¢ cient equilibrium (Hosios (1990) 
Calibration
is adjusted so that the steady state cost of adjusting the workforce is one percent of GDP. 13 Since we consider the role of the intensive margin, we also have to specify some individual parameters. The disutility parameter h is …xed to normalize steady state working time to 1 ( h = 1). The labor supply elasticity is …xed at 0:5, implying that parameter is 2, following the prior set on this parameter by Wouters (2005, 2007) .
The parameters representing the real and nominal rigidities that are at the core of the new generation of monetary models are calibrated following the priors considered by Wouters (2005, 2007) . 14 We set the habit formation parameter e = 0:70. We suppose a quadratic capital utilization cost ( = 1) and we choose ! = 1= 1 + to normalize steady state capital utilization rate to 1. We assume an annual in ‡ation of 2 percent, implying = 1 + 0:02=12.
The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is assumed to be 10, and the Calvo parameter for prices is p = 0:87 1=3 in order to reproduce the estimated elasticity of in ‡ation with respect to the real marginal cost. Prices that are not reset may be indexed to past in ‡ation or to trend in ‡ation. We assume that the weight p of past in ‡ation is 0.5. We follow Gertler and
Trigari (2006) and set the probability of bargaining the wage for an existing job at o w = 0:7 1=3 , implying that the average age of a wage contract is less than one year.
Finally, two parameters are set to match US data. The probability of bargaining the wage of a newly created job, n w , is …xed in order to …t the volatility of the US unemployment series (see Table 2 below). The investment adjustment cost parameter, ', is set to match the relative volatility of investment with respect to output for the data described in the next section.
[insert Table 1 ] 
Productivity shock
For the productivity shock, we mainly compare the ability of the various variants of our model to match second moments of US statistics. The US data we use for this exercise are the following: output, real hourly compensation, labor share, employment, unemployment, vacancies, hours, output per hour and output per person. All the series are quarterly data in the non-farm business sector from the BLS, except for 'unemployment', 15 which is a monthly series transformed into a quarterly one, and 'vacancies', which is the seasonally help wanted advertising index from the Conference Board, available at a monthly frequency and also transformed to quarterly frequency. Our sample runs from 1966Q1 to 2005Q4. In order to …x the investment adjustment 1 3 Imposing that the same proportion of GDP is devoted to the same employment adjustment cost in the steady state for all the variants of the model implies that we impose the same steady state wage. However, equation (24) clearly illustrates that the wage bargain will be very di¤erent from one variant to another and should imply di¤erences in the steady state wage. In order to avoid this, we adjust the parameter accordingly. 1 4 Quarterly parameters are transformed in monthly values. 1 5 Seasonally adjusted unemployment level (16 year and over).
cost parameter, we use the investment series from the US Department of Commerce -Bureau of Economic Analysis.
All series are logged and HP-…ltered with a 1600 smoothing weight. Their second moments are reported in the second column of Table 2 . The other columns contain statistics computed from the data generated after a productivity shock respectively by (i ) a model with monopolistic labor and nominal wage stickiness, denoted MC, (ii ) the model with sequential bargaining (SB), simulated for various values of workers'bargaining power in the hours negotiation and (iii ) the model with cooperatively chosen hours (CH).
The …rst row of Table 2 presents the calibrated values of workers'bargaining power h for the models with bargained hours. The second row displays the corresponding elasticity of the competitive price of labor with respect to wage. As was already clear from Figure 1 , the larger h , the lower the in ‡uence of wages on the competitive price of labor. In particular, for h = 0:97, this elasticity becomes zero, as in the model where hours are cooperatively chosen to maximize the joint period surplus. The third row is interesting as it presents n w , the wage rigidity on newly created jobs required to reproduce the observed standard deviation of unemployment relative to output. As we know since Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005b) , the more rigid the wage of new jobs, the more vacancies and (un)employment are volatile. Note that the higher h the less we need this type of rigidity to reproduce the relative volatility of US labor statistics. This is good news since many have claimed that the wage of the new jobs is actually more ‡exible than that of existing jobs (cf. for example Haefke et al. (2007) and Pissarides (2007) ). Interestingly, in the case h = 0, i.e. the 'right-to-manage'case, we are never able to produce realistic unemployment relative volatility. This can be easily understood. When the …rms are left free to optimize the working time, they will demand lots of hours from the workers with a relatively low wage and the other way round. In some sense, the adjustment along the intensive margin is so cheap and unconstrained that they have few incentives to adjust along the extensive margin. As h increases, …rms progressively lose this ‡exibility and eventually, once wage does not a¤ect hours (that is if h = 0:97 or if hours are cooperatively decided), all the workers provide the same working time, whatever their wage.
In this particular case, the model is exactly similar to Gertler and Trigari (2006) , but for the inclusion of hours. 16 The presence of hours explains that the observed unemployment relative standard deviation can be matched with n w , the degree of wage rigidity for the newly hired workers much lower than o w , the wage rigidity of the existing matches. This is simply because the procyclical behavior of hours increases the expected pro…tability of a new hire, reducing the need for a high n w . Note also that workers'bargaining power concerning their working time directly a¤ects their e¤ective bargaining power in the wage negotiation. For example, in the extreme case h = 0, workers internalize the fact that high wage requirements will imply very low working time and this reduces wage pressure. This mechanism is illustrated by the relative standard deviation of the hourly wage: the more wage is allocational for hours, the lower the volatility of the real hourly wage. While our models are rather good at matching the unemployment volatility, they have a harder job to produce enough volatility of total hours. From this viewpoint the best calibration of the sequential bargaining model is h = 0:40 as it matches both relative standard deviations. For higher values of the hours bargaining power -and for the model with cooperatively chosen hours-, individual hours reverse too quickly to the steady state as displayed by the serial correlation statistics. As already discussed, in the model with h = 0, it is the contrary that happens: individual hours are too volatile since the model is able to match the data relative standard deviation for this variable while it fails to reproduce observed employment relative volatility. Finally, the model with sequential bargaining and the model with cooperatively chosen hours perform quite well with respect to the relative volatility of hourly productivity and especially of worker productivity. However, these series are too highly correlated with output while their serial correlation is more in line with data. The sequential bargaining model also seems particularly good at reproducing the co-movement between output and the labor share, total hours or vacancies. Note that for the model with h = 0:40, this is also true of unemployment.
[insert Table 2 ] We conclude that the models with sequential bargaing or cooperatively chosen hours do not only provide a more complete picture of the labor market than the usual macroeconomic model with monopolistic labor: for the subset of concepts that are common with the latter model, they are most often at least as good in reproducing stylized facts.
Monetary policy shock
In the previous sub-section we focused on labor market variables. Let us now consider the ability of the various model variants to produce in ‡ation persistence. In this exercise we use the MC model as the benchmark since it has already proved to perform well on this aspect. We run our comparative analysis on the basis of impulse response functions after an unanticipated drop of 1 percentage point in the (annual) nominal interest rate. 
together with Figure 1 that graphs the values of H w , H and H for the chosen calibration. From this, it is obvious that for the h = 0, the wage channel is important since H w =H = 1. The value of the elasticity of the competitive price of labor with respect to wage is respectively 0.95 and 0 for the two other values of h . We observe that when h = 0, the model produces huge in ‡ation persistence. Indeed, marginal cost is the leading variable for in ‡ation dynamics in the new-Keynesian Phillips curve (4) and the competitive price of labor t is the major component of the the marginal cost. For h = 0, the third term on the RHS of (37) vanishes. As mentioned earlier, the labor force adjustment occurs mainly on the intensive margin but the movement in hours is counterbalanced by the weakness of its associated parameter in (37) . Therefore wages are the main explanatory variable of t and of marginal cost. Furthermore, as explained above, if …rms retain the right-to-manage working hours when wage negotiations are infrequent, this strongly reduces workers'bargaining power in the wage negotiation, implying very sticky wages.
As h increases, (i ) the workers'bargaining power in the wage negotiation is enhanced, leading progressively to a less sticky wage, (ii ) the aggregate wage coe¢ cient in equation (37) gets smaller but at a very slow pace, (iii ) aggregate individual hours react less strongly since more adjustment occurs along the intensive margin but the coe¢ cient of this variable increases rapidly with h and (iv ) the role of the marginal utility of consumption increases even though it remains moderate because of the weakness of the associated parameter. These four elements go in the same direction and contribute together to generate more volatility in the competitive price of labor, and consequently in in ‡ation.
[insert Figure 2] It is also interesting to illustrate how the Calvo parameter w , the volatility of employment falls and individual hours have to vary much more to compensate. This higher volatility of aggregate individual hours is the main source of the small increase in in ‡ation we observe when the wage is not allocational for hours and the Calvo probability of re-bargaining an existing job increases. 17 [insert Figure 3] Finally, Table 1 and Figure 4 illustrate very similar dynamics for the models characterized by a wage that is not allocational for hours. From this, we conclude that our variant of the sequential bargaining model with a workers'bargaining power on individual hours worked strong enough for all workers to share the same working time is a good approximation of the Thomas (2008) model where hours are chosen in a privately e¢ cient way to maximize the period surplus.
[insert Figure 4] 
Conclusion
The present paper extends the literature on monetary models with search and matching frictions on the labor market. It builds upon the seminal work of Trigari (2006) We establish that when …rms retain the right-to-manage the hours worked in a framework with staggered wage bargaining, the result is an unrealistic volatility of the individual hours and too little volatility of employment. The reason is simply that …rms can adjust easily along the intensive margin by asking the workers in the bottom of the wage distribution to work a lot.
This generates an unrealistic distribution of individual hours and strongly reduces the e¤ective bargaining power of the workers in the wage negotiation.
In order to counteract these pernicious e¤ects, we amend the model to give workers the possibility to a¤ect hours. For this we introduce a bargain on working time that is activated every period unlike the wage bargain. We show that reducing the …rms'prerogatives this way reduces their incentive to adjust along the extensive margin and helps to produce realistic labor market statistics. In this sense, it plays a role similar to the …xed cost introduced by Christo¤el 
